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NO. 41 OCTOBER 2018 Introduction
Israel’s Nation-State Law 
Netanyahu Government Lays the Foundations for a Majoritarian System 
Peter Lintl and Stefan Wolfrum 
On 19 July 2018, the Israeli parliament passed legislation known as the nation-state 
law. It is highly controversial in Israel as well as internationally, although strictly 
speaking there is little new contained in it. Its advocates emphasise that it merely 
gives expression to existing realities. Critics argue that the law discriminates against 
minorities, runs counter to democratic values and, in particular, undermines the 
principle of equality. The debate reveals the social tension in Israel between its 
‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ identity. In addition, it becomes clear that the main sup-
porters of the law on the government side have more far-reaching intentions than 
its wording suggests. Their aim is to place Jewish collective rights above individual 
rights and freedoms. The law is, therefore, also a manifestation of current govern-
ment policy aimed at leading Israel away from a more liberal democracy and towards 
a majoritarian democracy. In particular, this policy affects the Supreme Court as a 
defender of liberal principles. 
 
Israel does not have a constitution, instead 
it has a set of basic laws that have consti-
tutional status. This is because since the 
state was founded in 1948, there has never 
been any agreement on what precisely the 
“Jewish” in the Jewish state is supposed to 
be and how the state’s Jewishness relates to 
its democratic character. The newly adopted 
14th law entitled, “Basic Law: Israel – The 
Nation State of the Jewish People” claims 
to codify the Jewish element of the state. 
It declares – with constitutional status – 
Israel to be a Jewish state. Given that the 
law is supposed to define the character of 
the state, it must be accorded high status, 
comparable to the preamble of a consti-
tution. 
The law has been a long time coming. 
Since 2011, a variety of different drafts 
have been discussed in the Knesset. There 
was widespread support among the Zionist 
parties for the need to establish the Jewish 
nation-state character in Israel’s Basic Law. 
The motivation for this is mainly fuelled by 
three developments. Firstly, stagnation in 
the peace process with the Palestinians has 
meant that, for the majority of Israelis, the 
most important social goal is no longer a 
peace agreement, but the preservation of 
Israel as a Jewish state. Secondly, to reject 
the demands of post-Zionists and the Arab 
minority in the country who want to define 
Israel as a neutral rather than a Jewish 
state. Thirdly, the nation-state law serves 
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as a proactive statement against attempts 
to de-legitimise Israel, in particular by the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
movement, which is campaigning inter-
nationally for economic, political and cul-
tural sanctions against Israel. 
Nevertheless, the recently passed version 
of the law was heavily debated in Israel. 
Amir Ohana (Likud), chairman of the joint 
committee that legislated the nation-state 
law, described it as the “most important 
law in the history of the state of Israel”. For 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the 
law takes Israel to its historical destiny – 
fulfilling the tenets of Zionism. Some Arab 
Members of the Knesset, on the other hand, 
ripped up copies of the law as it was adopted 
and repeatedly shouted “apartheid” at its 
supporters. In addition, the Jewish oppo-
sition, many civil society organisations and 
even President Reuven Rivlin have denounced 
the law as being discriminatory, unneces-
sary and flawed. It has also received strong 
criticism internationally – from the EU to 
representatives of Reform Judaism in the 
US and internationally renowned Israeli 
lobbyists, such as Alan Dershowitz, who 
said the law made it harder to defend Israel. 
In contrast, its supporters argue that the 
law only articulates what is already a reality: 
Israel is a Jewish state. In their view, former 
legislation adopted by a liberal Israeli elite 
has created an imbalance in which the 
Jewish element of the state is no longer 
sufficiently asserted. They claim the nation-
state law has redressed this imbalance. 
Key contentious issues 
Although some stipulations in the law are 
new, many of the regulations can already 
be found in existing laws. However, these 
regulations now have constitutional status. 
Many aspects have a purely declarative char-
acter. For example, the law regulates state 
symbols (flag, national anthem, coats of 
arms), calendars (Hebrew and Gregorian) as 
well as public holidays and rest days. In ad-
dition, it confirms current practice, such as 
immigration opportunities for all Jews and 
the state’s strong connection to the Jew-
ish diaspora in general. It also affirms the 
status of the whole of Jerusalem as the 
state’s capital, although this was already 
enshrined in a separate Basic Law in 1980. 
That the law continues to court fierce con-
troversy, is essentially due to four conten-
tious issues. 
Codification of Israel as a 
Jewish state 
The sharpest criticism is reserved for Sec-
tion 1 of the law, which defines Israel 
as the historical homeland of the Jewish 
people and exclusively grants the Jewish 
people the right to national self-deter-
mination in the country. The understand-
ing of ‘Jewishness’ refers above all to the 
character of Judaism as a nation, as for-
mulated by Zionism. This does not mean 
that the religious and ethnic elements of 
Judaism are ignored, but the purpose of the 
law is to stress the legitimacy for independ-
ent statehood, which is inherent in any 
national self-understanding. 
Against the backdrop of this self-under-
standing, the creation of a Jewish state is 
the raison d’être that underpins Israel, and 
a fact that has been expressed in many of 
the country’s other laws and jurisprudence. 
Israel declared itself an independent Jewish 
state as early as 1948 and was recognised by 
the majority of the international communi-
ty. Nevertheless, the question of whether 
Israel should be a Jewish state is highly con-
troversial among Arab and Jewish Israelis. 
Large parts of the Arab-Palestinian popu-
lation categorically reject this section of the 
law. From their point of view, such a defini-
tion has a discriminatory component since 
the further legalization of the Jewish char-
acter of the state cements the division be-
tween Arab and Jewish citizens. For, unlike 
in many western states, citizenship in Israel 
is not identical to the identity of the state. 
While you can be an Israeli citizen, there 
is no Israeli nationality – as the Supreme 
Court has declared in a ruling. For example, 
Israeli birth certificates differentiate be-
tween Jewish and Arab citizens. 
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As a result, the character of the state is 
determined by the national majority, which 
automatically gives the non-Jewish minor-
ities secondary status, at least in any fun-
damental issues where state identity is 
concerned. Whether a state that links its 
identity to the nationality of the majority, 
defined along ethnic and religious lines, 
is sui generis discriminatory is a matter 
of heated debate in Israel – in politics as 
well as in civil society and academia. It is 
a question that touches fundamentally 
divergent concepts of the state. Opponents 
of the idea of the Jewish state call for a 
neutral state based on a liberal notion of 
popular sovereignty that does not permit 
the representation of majorities or minor-
ities in state legislation. The other side 
argues that such flawless liberalism only 
exists on paper. References are made to 
examples such as Spain, Latvia or Croatia – 
countries that constitutionally define 
nation-state identity through the majority 
society. Even the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe attests that nation-
ality is not necessarily to be equated with 
citizenship (given that its Member States 
follow different concepts of ‘nation’ that 
are not compatible with each other). 
Arab-Palestinian politicians are, there-
fore, calling for a “state for all citizens”, 
sometimes also postulating the right to 
question the Jewish character of Israel. In 
contrast, many Jewish Israelis see the “state 
for all citizens” formula as a denial of Isra-
el’s right to exist. Consequently, the Knesset 
has tried several times to pass a bill that 
would disqualify parties with such inten-
tions from participating in parliamentary 
elections – but the Supreme Court has so 
far prevented this. 
The historical genesis of the state of Israel 
further exacerbates this dispute. It is inex-
tricably linked to the flight of the Jews from 
European anti-Semitism and also the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, in which both sides – 
Zionists and Palestinians – make a historic 
claim to the same piece of land. The discus-
sion about the nation-state law is, therefore, 
also an expression of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict which remains unresolved to this day. 
Importance of 
democratic principles 
Unlike the question of Israel’s Jewish char-
acter, Jewish and Arab critics of the law 
agree on the principle of “equality”. They 
unanimously complain that this principle, 
which had not been enshrined in any 
Israeli Basic Law before, was not included 
in the nation-state law and that this would 
undermine basic democratic principles. 
Jewish opposition politicians had suggested 
that the Declaration of Independence from 
1948 be passed as a Basic Law. It declared 
Israel a Jewish state, but assured all citizens 
social and political equality. Israeli histo-
rian, Alexander Yakobson, pointed out that 
while there are a number of countries in 
which state identity is the nationality of the 
majority, the principle of equality is present 
in all these countries. 
However, it is no coincidence that the 
principle of equality is not mentioned in 
the law. In the previous legislative period, 
attempts were made to reach a compromise 
between the Jewish parties in order to in-
clude this principle into the bill. But this 
failed because of resistance from Likud and 
the Jewish Home. Representatives of these 
parties argued that the principle of equality 
could be interpreted by the Supreme Court 
as a collective rather than an individual prin-
ciple. It would therefore be better to omit 
the principle altogether than to take the 
risk that Palestinian Israelis would ultimate-
ly be granted collective rights through the 
Supreme Court. Yariv Levin (Likud), one of 
the architects of the law, explicitly stated that 
the inclusion of a general principle of equali-
ty is “the exact opposite of what I want”. 
The relationship of the state to the prin-
ciple of democracy has not been addressed 
in the text of the law, although the latter 
was anchored in most of the bills. However, 
in these versions, the principle of democra-
cy was subordinated to the Jewish character 
of the state, which found no majority with-
in the governing coalition. The Kulanu 
party, in particular, was against such a hier-
archisation, fearing the democratic char-
acter of Israel would be compromised. This 
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ultimately meant that any definition for 
the relationship between Jewish and demo-
cratic was omitted. When representatives 
of the government point out that the rela-
tionship between democracy and Judaism 
is already contained in the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Freedom from 17 March 
1992, this sounds contradictory because, 
according to Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked 
(Jewish Home), the nation-state law should 
“protect the Jewish character of the state, 
even if that means sacrificing human 
rights”. 
Regulations on minorities 
Article 7 of the law says that Jewish settle-
ment of the land represents a national 
value and should, therefore, be promoted. 
This formulation actually represents a 
compromise by the government. An earlier 
draft even mentioned communities segre-
gated by religion and nationality. After 
sharp protests, even from within the gov-
ernment, this passage was changed – 
also because Israel Beitenu, the party of 
the Russian-speaking minority, which, 
in part, is not even recognised as being 
Jewish, feared being discriminated against. 
The opposition is critical of any explicit 
promotion of Jewish and not Arab settle-
ments, especially considering the infrastruc-
ture in Arab cities has thus far been sorely 
neglected. In the past, such regulations 
were prohibited by the Supreme Court. It is 
a long-pursued project of the Israeli right to 
give (also legal) preference to Jewish settle-
ment. The central idea is that there should 
be no regional Arab majority anywhere in 
Israel. In particular, this applies to areas 
with a lower Jewish share of population, 
such as Galilee or the Negev. The passage 
adopted now does not exclude further settle-
ments in the West Bank. It was introduced 
by Naftali Bennett, chairman of the Jewish 
Home Party which is in favour of at least 
partially annexing the area. In general, a 
large number of parliamentarians who ap-
proved the nation-state law have also de-
manded an annexation or partial annexa-
tion of the West Bank. 
Section 4 of the law is even more contro-
versial. It states that the Arabic language 
should retain its special status in Israel and 
that this clause does not change the status 
given to the Arabic language before the 
basic law was created. However, Arabic has, 
in fact, been downgraded by the law be-
cause it will no longer be an official state 
language. How this will affect the position 
of Arabic in the country is unclear. In any 
case, the regulation has clear symbolic power 
in the context of the already tense relation-
ship between the Arab Israelis – especially 
those of Palestinian origin – and the Jewish 
majority. Even veteran Likud politicians 
like Benny Begin or Moshe Arens doubt the 
necessity of this paragraph. They warn that 
it may contribute to an unnecessary wors-
ening of the relationship between Jews and 
Arabs in the state. 
Redefining the relationship with 
the Jewish diaspora 
Many progressive Jewish voices in the US 
share these criticisms. However, one para-
graph in the law is explicitly directed 
against Reform Judaism itself, which makes 
up the bulk of the US diaspora. At the last 
minute, the original formulation that the 
state works “everywhere” to strengthen the 
relationship between the Jewish diaspora 
and Israel was changed and now stipulates 
that the state is only active “among the 
Jewish diaspora” in order to achieve this 
(Section 6b). This passage, reformulated at 
the insistence of the ultra-Orthodox, is 
designed to rule out Reform Judaism being 
able to influence Israeli jurisprudence in 
respect of conversions and the status of 
non-Orthodox Jewish denominations. This 
is intended to consolidate the hegemonic 
status that Orthodoxy has in Israel with 
regard to outside interference in religious 
matters. Moreover, the passage paves the 
way for state-subsidised influence of Ortho-
doxy on the Jewish diaspora. This is also 
made clear in Section 6c which states that 
Israel will “act to preserve the cultural, his-
torical and religious heritage of the Jewish 
people among Jews in the Diaspora”. Here, 
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Israel is implicitly asserting interpretive 
sovereignty over essential issues of Jewish 
identity worldwide. 
The nation-state law also explicitly stipu-
lates, for the first time, that the Jewish 
people’s religious right to self-determina-
tion is fulfilled in the state of Israel. A lot of 
the meaning is lost in translation because 
the Hebrew word ‘dati’ not only means reli-
gious, but is also synonymous with ‘ortho-
dox’. The confessional pluralism of American 
Judaism does effectively not exist in Israel 
so when it talks about religion, it means the 
orthodox interpretation of Judaism. The in-
clusion of this formulation reflects chang-
ing demographic realities. Meanwhile, the 
Orthodox population accounts for just 
under one quarter of the total Jewish popu-
lation. Therefore, these passages in the law 
are also indicators of a growing gap between 
Israel and the American-Jewish diaspora, 
as seen in recent years in questions of con-
version, restrictions on non-Orthodox 
denominations at the Wailing Wall and 
even general religious practice in Israel. 
The political intention 
behind the law 
Beyond the specific passages discussed, the 
law has a deeper thrust that goes further 
than the wording of the text. In essence, 
it is about whether the state should be 
characterised by a civil nationalism that 
emphasises universal principles, such as 
equality or individual values and freedoms, 
or by a nationalism that emphasises par-
ticular collective rights that are ethnically, 
nationalistically or religiously justified. 
Proponents of the law adhere to the latter. 
In their eyes, the law is a tool to move the 
state in that direction. 
In doing so, the nation-state law is di-
rected, in particular, against the “Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty” from 1992. It 
codified, for the first time, individual basic 
rights, human rights and freedoms into 
basic law and also stipulated that the state 
of Israel was Jewish and democratic. This 
had far-reaching consequences because 
this law allowed judicial review complaints 
against legislative decisions made by the 
Knesset to be put before the Supreme Court. 
This is why this unprecedented amendment 
is commonly referred to as the ‘constitu-
tional revolution’ in Israel. 
However, these far-reaching develop-
ments on the part of the judiciary are 
controversial for various reasons. Firstly, 
the possibility of a judicial review was only 
brought about by a ruling from the Su-
preme Court, similar to what happened 
historically in the US. However, since this 
was not intended by the Knesset legislation, 
opponents see this as an illegitimate infil-
tration of popular sovereignty by the judi-
ciary. Secondly, President of the Supreme 
Court, Aharon Barak, argued that the word 
“Jewish” in the phrase ‘Jewish and demo-
cratic’ by no means refers to religious tra-
dition. Rather, it merely emphasises the uni-
versal values of the Jewish Enlightenment. 
Barak had, therefore, at a stroke defined the 
Jewish character of the state without any 
social consensus. Thirdly, Barak is accused 
of having established judicial actionism in 
the wake of the constitutional revolution, 
under the premise that everything is justi-
ciable, which interferes too much with the 
interests of the executive and legislative 
branches. In so doing, the Court is alleged 
to have established case law that is too 
liberal and too targeted at individual rights. 
As a result, minority interests would be 
given preference over majority interests. 
The real intention of proponents of the 
nation-state law is probably to reverse these 
developments. The main protagonists here 
are the Likud and Jewish Home parties who 
have managed to assert themselves against 
critics of the law within their own govern-
ment – in particular, the ultra-Orthodox 
parties and Kulanu. As Ayelet Shaked ex-
plained, “the constitutional revolution has 
emptied the idea of a Jewish state of its 
content” and “radically sanctioned individ-
ual rights”. The Minister of Justice called for 
a moral and political revolution to reverse 
the problematic trend that had destroyed 
the achievements of Zionism. Similarly, 
Likud politician Yariv Levin argued that the 
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law would reverse the consequences of the 
constitutional revolution and establish new 
legal foundations and a new state identity. 
Specifically, this is directed against 
Supreme Court rulings over the last two 
decades which have given precedence to 
individual rights and freedoms over major-
ity rights. These include repeatedly over-
turning Knesset-imposed disqualifications 
of Arab parties calling for a “state for all 
citizens”; the ruling on maintaining family 
reunification of Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Israel; the ban on detaining refu-
gees; the evacuation of ‘outposts’ of Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank; as well as the 
priority given to freedom of expression and 
art in relation to public outrage over, for 
example, the film “Jenin, Jenin” and pro-
hibiting the prioritisation of expanding and 
maintaining exclusively Jewish over non-
Jewish settlements (as in the Kaadan case). 
According to right-wing politicians, all 
these – and other – judgments were based 
on an incorrect evaluation of norms; in their 
view, the Supreme Court should have ruled 
in an opposite manner in all these cases. 
It is clear to the initiators of the nation-
state law that this can only be a first step 
towards fully implementing desired changes 
in the state – which are already evident in 
education, the military and cultural policy, 
because how the law is interpreted depends 
on the respective judges at the Supreme 
Court. Yariv Levin said, “Its major test will 
be in its application”; a change in the legal 
system will only ultimately be possible if 
the composition of the court is also changed. 
The government has already reformed the 
election of judges and awarded four of the 
six judicial posts to be filled in this legis-
lative period to decidedly conservative can-
didates. This is flanked by political initia-
tives, such as the adoption of an “Override 
Clause” (Piskat HaHitgabrut), through 
which the Knesset can overturn judgments 
made by the Supreme Court. A similar 
clause was included in a previous draft of 
the nation-state law, but was ultimately 
removed due to lack of majority support: It 
would have meant that any jurisprudence 
in Israel – including other Basic Laws – 
would have to be interpreted through the 
prism of the nation-state law and therefore 
be subordinate to the Jewish character. 
However, the right-wing conservative 
thinkers in Likud and the Jewish Home are 
not just concerned with the end of ‘liberal 
supremacy’ in the legal system. In the long 
term, they are aiming to develop a new 
understanding of the state, according to 
which the common good is determined in 
favour of the collective (albeit with liberal 
economic influences). The protagonists see 
themselves as having the responsibility to 
define the constitutional foundations of the 
common good according to national, ethnic 
and/or religious principles. This vision ex-
plicitly contradicts both secular-socialist 
Worker Zionism from the first decades of 
the state as well as the liberal-universalist 
legal interpretation from the 1990s and 
even the national-liberal principles of the 
ideological founding fathers of Likud, such 
as Zeev Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin. 
Adopting the nation-state law is clearly 
an attempt to lead the political system of 
Israel in a majoritarian direction. Individual 
minority rights, protected by constitutional 
paragraphs and separation of powers, are 
to be restricted by Jewish majorities in the 
Knesset. Israel’s current government is join-
ing political currents similar to those in 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and elsewhere, 
where illiberal and ethno-national politics 
are practiced on behalf of the majority. This 
policy is justified as being a fight against an 
elitist liberal minority that is imposing its 
universalist view of the world on the major-
ity. Netanyahu’s recent statement that “the 
majority have rights too, and the majority 
rules” is typical of such a populist approach. 
According to this logic, these advances by 
the political right are also passed off as a 
commitment to more democracy.  
Initiatives aimed at weakening the legal 
status of minorities are accompanied by a 
rhetoric that increasingly portrays the Arab-
Palestinian community, as well as leftist 
Israelis, as an unwanted part of society. 
Netanyahu has insinuated that the coun-
try’s Arab population is a fifth column, an 
internal enemy. This is again emphasized 
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in the campaigns for the municipal elec-
tions of October 2018, where the Likud ad-
vertises it is either “us or them”; insinuat-
ing voting for left or Arab parties will lead 
to Islamic terrorism. In a similar mind set, 
Minister of Culture, Miri Regev, has called 
for loyalty tests and Israel Beitenu for oaths 
of allegiance from members of non-Jewish 
minorities. Simultaneously, there are ef-
forts to limit the visibility of Arab-Palestin-
ian culture. Minister of Education, Naftali 
Bennet, removed a short story called Bor-
derlife from the education syllabus because 
it contains a Jewish-Arab romance. Defense 
Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, demanded 
that poems by award-winning Palestinian 
national poet, Mahmoud Darwish, be banned 
from Army Radio. Several members of the 
government have introduced bills to restrict 
or prohibit the use of loudspeakers for 
Muslim calls to prayer. 
At the same time, the nation-state law 
has not only been adopted for ideological 
reasons, but also as an election tactic. Prime 
Minister Netanyahu is clearly benefiting 
from the increased social polarisation this 
law is causing. Firstly, he can portray his 
own opponents as unpatriotic, highlighting 
the contrast between right and left. Secondly, 
the law has weakened the opposition be-
cause it has accentuated the differences 
between its Jewish and Arab critics. In this 
respect, launching the law was also a po-
litical move by Netanyahu along the lines 
of divide and rule. 
Outlook 
To what extent the law will be upheld by 
the Supreme Court remains to be seen. In 
Israel, the question as to whether there can 
be a so-called “unconstitutional constitution-
al amendment” i.e. whether the Supreme 
Court can also rule on a constitutional 
amendment, remains unresolved. A judg-
ment on this issue would create a prece-
dent. The Supreme Court has already filed 
lawsuits against the nation-state law. In this 
context, Ayelet Shaked has said that repeal-
ing the law would amount to an “earth-
quake” and would lead to a “war” between 
the institutions. The Supreme Court has yet 
to comment on this case. However, in pre-
vious judgments, president Esther Hayut has 
suggested that a constitutional review could 
also be carried out on a basic law where it un-
dermines Israel’s democratic identity and the 
foundations of its constitutional structure. 
From a German and European point of 
view, it is important to note that, despite all 
the national and international criticism, the 
law does not mean the end of Israeli democ-
racy. However, the current government’s 
efforts to transform Israel from a liberal 
democracy (which was limited anyway) to a 
majoritarian democracy are clearly visible. 
The decisive factor will be how the law 
is implemented in legal practice. Three re-
quirements are particularly important here: 
maintaining the separation of powers, en-
titlement of all citizens to equality before 
the law and protecting minorities against 
discrimination. Should – as critics of the 
law fear – minorities become second-class 
citizens in legal practice, the “Jewish and 
democratic state” project threatens to run 
into even greater difficulties. It is, therefore, 
more important than ever to maintain a per-
manent dialogue with Israel, referencing 
the various agreements the country has with 
the EU, on the basis of which the observance 
of human rights and democratic standards 
were established. Indeed, by adopting this 
law, Israel is joining the ranks of states that 
are increasingly turning away from the prin-
ciples of liberal democracy established in 
the post-war West. However, supporters of 
the law – including Netanyahu – often 
argue that the law lies within the frame-
work of the principles of ‘Western democra-
cies’. In this respect, it is also important to 
them that Israel is internationally perceived 
as a democratic state belonging to the West. 
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